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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
Nos. 12-3285 and 12-3367 
______________ 
 
TAE IN KIM; 
DAVID D. KIM, 
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
DONGBU TOUR & TRAVEL, INC; 
KYU SUNG CHO, 
 
         Appellants 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-12-01136) 
District Judge:  Hon. William H. Walls  
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 14, 2013 
 
Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, and AMBRO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 19, 2013) 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge 
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 This matter comes on before this Court on consolidated appeals brought by 
Dongbu Tour & Travel, Inc. and Kyu Sung Cho, its president (together called “Dongbu”) 
from orders in this action that Tae In Kim and David D. Kim, who claim to be Dongbu’s 
employees, initiated in the District Court under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the 
New Jersey Wage and Hour Law.  The Kims are attempting to bring the case as a class 
action to include other individuals similarly situated to them.   
 The appeals are from two orders.1
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 and 1367 and 29 
U.S.C. § 216(b), and we have jurisdiction over the appeal in No. 12-3285 under 9 U.S.C. 
§ 16(a).  Dongbu claims that we have jurisdiction in No. 12-3367 under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(a), but we reject this contention.  We are exercising plenary review on this appeal.  
See Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., No. 12-1170, ____ F.3d ____, 
____, 2013 WL 2302324, at *5 (3d Cir. May 28, 2013). 
  The first order from which Dongbu appeals 
was entered on July 23, 2012, and denied the Kims’ motion for a preliminary injunction 
in which they sought an order restraining Dongbu from retaliating against them for 
bringing this action.  Though the Kims did not appeal from the July 23, 2012 order, that 
order included a provision from which Dongbu appeals prohibiting the parties from 
communicating with members of the putative class that the Kims seek to represent until 
the resolution of class certification issues.  Dongbu’s appeal from the July 23, 2012 order 
is docketed as No. 12-3367.  The second order from which Dongbu appeals is an order of 
July 25, 2012, denying Dongbu’s motion to require that the Kims’ claims be submitted to 
arbitration.   This appeal is docketed as No. 12-3285.   
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 The background of the case is as follows.  The Kims were tour guides working in 
the Korean tour business.  There is a substantial tour business in the United States 
catering to Koreans, including both individuals who reside in Korea and individuals of 
Korean background who reside in the United States.  It appears that tour companies 
catering to Koreans seek to engage guides with Korean backgrounds to conduct their 
tours and we draw an inference from the Kims’ surnames that they are of that 
background.  Dongbu, evidently aware of federal and state laws which in various ways 
regulate employer-employee relationships in the interest of protecting employees’ rights, 
desired to obtain the Kims’ services on an independent contractor basis, a not uncommon 
practice among employers who attempt to circumvent such employee protection laws.   
 Dongbu, in furtherance of its attempt to employ the Kims on an independent 
contractor basis, sought to have the Kims form businesses which Dongbu intended would 
be deemed to be the Kims’ employers, to the end that Dongbu could contract for the 
Kims’ services through the businesses rather than directly with the Kims.  Thus, in its 
brief Dongbu sets forth that “Tae In Kim and David D. Kim are employees of X Golf, 
Inc. (X Golf) and DDK NY, Corp. (DDK NY), respectively . . . .”  Appellants’ br. at 35-
36.2
                                              
2 Sometimes on this appeal Dongbu seems to refer to DDK NY as a corporation but at 
other times it seems to regard it as an unincorporated entity.  The distinction is not 
material to us on this appeal.  
  Dongbu, however, did not sign agreements with the Kims’ businesses.  Rather, in an 
attempt to separate itself still further from the Kims, Dongbu sought to have the Kims’ 
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companies sign what are entitled independent contractor agreements with Guide USA 
Inc., an entity that Dongbu describes as a “tour guide management company through 
which [the Kims] worked as tour guides on tour programs operated by Dongbu.”  
Appellants’ br. at 24.  The agreement between DDK NY, David Kim’s company, and 
Guide USA contained an arbitration provision providing a procedure for the resolution of 
disputes between David Kim and Guide USA.  But neither Dongbu nor Tae In Kim was a 
party to that agreement.  Inasmuch as Tae In Kim did not sign an agreement with Guide 
USA and he, like David Kim, did not sign a contract with Dongbu, Dongbu never has 
been able to produce in this litigation an agreement in which Tae In Kim agreed in 
writing to any provision material to Dongbu’s demand for arbitration. 
 Notwithstanding Dongbu’s attempt to classify the Kims as independent 
contractors with respect to their relationships with Dongbu, the Kims brought this action 
against Dongbu claiming to be Dongbu’s employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law.  The Kims advance substantive claims that we 
need not describe in further detail asserting that they were not paid in full for the services 
they rendered to Dongbu.  Dongbu moved on April 4, 2012, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint, and then, after the Court denied its motion on June 6, 
2012, Dongbu answered the complaint on June 28, 2012, without raising an arbitration 
defense.   
 The Kims by bringing this case hit a raw nerve with Dongbu, which wrote other 
tour companies about the litigation in a letter dated March 1, 2012.  The Kims viewed the 
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letter as an act of unlawful retaliation against them for bringing this action, and 
consequently they filed a motion in the District Court on March 23, 2012, seeking a 
preliminary injunction precluding Dongbu from retaliating against them for bringing this 
case.  The District Court held a hearing on the March 23, 2012 motion on July 5, 2012, 
and then denied the motion by order of July 23, 2012, on the ground that the Kims could 
not show that there was a likelihood that they would suffer irreparable injury if the Court 
denied their motion.  The Court, however, entered an order on July 23, 2012, though none 
of the parties had sought that order, that “temporarily enjoined [all the parties] from 
communicating directly with any member of the putative collective action about this 
case” until class certification issues are resolved and a notification plan is approved.  
App. at 684.   
 At the July 5, 2012 hearing in the District Court Dongbu moved to have the Kims’ 
claims sent to arbitration, the first time that it raised a defense that the Kims agreed to 
arbitrate their claims in this case.  Though the Kims and Dongbu were not joint parties to 
any arbitration agreement, Dongbu claims to be a third-party beneficiary of the 
agreement between David Kim and Guide USA to which it claims Tae In Kim also 
adhered, at least with respect to its provision for arbitration of disputes.  The District 
Court denied this motion by order of July 25, 2012, and subsequently denied Dongbu’s 
motion for reconsideration of that order.   
 As we have indicated, Dongbu has filed two appeals.  First, Dongbu has appealed 
from the order of July 25, 2012, denying Dongbu’s demand that the dispute be arbitrated.  
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Next Dongbu has appealed from the order of July 23, 2012, enjoining the parties from 
communicating with class members until resolution of class certification issues.  On 
November 7, 2012, Dongbu moved in this Court to stay all further proceedings in the 
District Court, and on November 27, 2012, we granted that motion under Fed. R. App. P. 
8. 
 The parties raise four issues on this appeal in one or both of their briefs.  The first 
issue which only Dongbu discusses is whether after Dongbu appealed from the order 
denying its motion seeking an order requiring that the parties’ disputes be resolved in an 
arbitration proceeding, the proceedings in the case could continue in the District Court or 
whether the proceedings in that Court automatically were stayed pending disposition of 
the appeal.  In this regard we point out that ordinarily an appeal from an order denying a 
motion for arbitration divests a district court of jurisdiction over the action that a party 
seeks to have submitted to arbitration, and thus the appeal automatically stays 
proceedings in the district court.  See Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 
215 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007).  But the appeal will not stay the district court proceedings if it is 
“frivolous or forfeited.”  Id.  Dongbu has raised the question of whether a court of 
appeals or a district court decides if the appeal is frivolous for jurisdictional purposes 
following an appeal from an order denying a motion seeking an order requiring that a 
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case be submitted to arbitration, its contention being that a court of appeals should decide 
that question.  For the reasons that we will set forth, we do not decide this issue.3
 The second of the four issues is whether under Rule 12(b)(6) the District Court 
should have granted the motion to dismiss, but we do not reach this issue on the merits 
either as we do not have jurisdiction at this time over the appeal from the order denying 
the motion.  The third and fourth issues are whether the District Court should have 
ordered the case to be submitted to arbitration and whether the District Court should have 
entered the July 23, 2012 order precluding the parties from having communications with 
members of the class that the Kims seek to represent.  We will decide the third issue on 
the merits but will dismiss the appeal from the July 23, 2012 order as we do not have 
jurisdiction over the appeal from that order. 
   
 We deal first with the appeal from the order of July 23, 2012, i.e., the order over 
which Dongbu contends that we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  In 
Cohen v. Board of Trustees, 867 F.2d 1455, 1465 (3d Cir. 1989), we explained that “an 
injunction for purposes of [an appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §] 1292(a)(1) . . . must . . . 
adjudicate some of the relief sought in the complaint.”  The July 23, 2012 order, though 
reciting that the Court has “enjoined” the parties from engaging in certain 
communications, does not address any aspect of the relief that the Kims seek in the 
                                              
3 When we granted the stay under Fed. R. App. 8 we did not address the “frivolous or 
forfeited” jurisdictional question. 
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complaint.  It is strictly a case management order, and thus we will dismiss the appeal 
from that order.4
 Similarly, we do not consider on the merits the appeal from the denial of 
Dongbu’s motion under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint, as we can decide the 
question of whether there should be arbitration in this case without addressing the motion 
to dismiss and the District Court’s order denying the motion is not in itself appealable at 
this time.  We also do not decide definitively whether a district court or a court of appeals 
decides whether an appeal is frivolous so that the filing of the appeal does not divest the 
district court of jurisdiction over proceedings in the pending action in which arbitration is 
sought.  We see no reason to decide that question because we are holding that the District 
Court correctly denied the order seeking arbitration, and this case will continue in the 
District Court after we file this opinion and remand the case to that Court.  After the 
remand, the District Court will have jurisdiction over the case and can make all 
appropriate orders and, if necessary, revisit orders that it already has entered.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 54(b).   
 
 Finally, we reach the appeal from the order of July 25, 2012, denying the motion 
for arbitration on the merits and will affirm that order for the following reasons.5
                                              
4 We realize that the Kims do not contend that we do not have jurisdiction over the appeal 
from the July 23, 2012 order, but we are obliged to consider the jurisdictional issue on 
our own initiative.  See Three Keys Ltd. v. SR Utility Holding Co., 540 F.3d 220, 225 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  Of course, the procedural circumstance that the District Court entered the 
order at a time that it was considering the Kims’ motion for a preliminary injunction did 
not somehow convert the case management order into an appealable injunctive order. 
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Dongbu correctly claims that in some cases a third-party beneficiary of a contract can 
enforce an arbitration clause in the contract included for its benefit even though it did not 
sign the contract.  See E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin 
Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2001).  Certainly this is so in collective 
bargaining agreements.  But Dongbu has not produced any agreement that Tae In Kim 
signed containing an arbitration clause.  Indeed, in its opening brief Dongbu says 
“[a]lthough Appellants are without a copy of the Independent Contractor agreement 
which may have been signed by X Golf, Inc. (the direct employer of Tae In Kim), Guide 
USA believes that it was signed and in any event Guide USA received Tae In Kim’s 
verbal assent to the same Independent Contractor agreement as DKK NY’s version 
quoted above.”  Appellants’ br. at 23. 
 Dongbu’s claim that Tae In Kim agreed to arbitrate any dispute that he might have 
with Dongbu is devoid of any possible merit, as the District Court plainly believed, 
because Dongbu wants us to require him to arbitrate his claims pursuant to an arbitration 
clause contained in a contract that it cannot show that he executed or to which he is not a 
party on the theory that he orally agreed to be bound by that contract.  We find it 
extraordinary that Dongbu’s support for its contention that Tae In Kim is bound by his 
                                                                                                                                                  
5 In its brief Dongbu asserts that “the district court erred as a matter of law in failing to 
order arbitration where the [Kims] admittedly executed arbitration covenants relating to 
their compensation dispute they brought against [Dongbu].”  Appellants’ br. at 3.  In fact, 
however, the Kims deny that they executed any such covenants, as David Kim, who did 
execute an agreement providing for arbitration with Guide USA certainly denies that the 
agreement somehow obligated him to arbitrate this dispute with Dongbu.  
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alleged consent to such agreement is an allegation in the Kims’ complaint that they were 
“required to sign form contracts with Dongbu but are actually Dongbu’s employees as a 
matter of law.”  Appellants’ br. at 23-24.  Yet the contract that David Kim signed was not 
with Dongbu, it was with Guide USA and even if Tae In Kim had adhered to the 
arbitration clause in the contract, he would not have been agreeing to arbitrate any 
dispute with Dongbu.  The fact is that insofar as the record on this appeal shows neither 
Kim signed any agreement with Dongbu.  In these circumstances Tae In Kim – who 
Dongbu does not show ever signed any agreement with Dongbu, Guide USA, DDK NY, 
or X Golf that contained an arbitration clause, and, indeed, did not sign any agreement at 
all with any of these entities – under any conceivable view of the record and the law, 
cannot be compelled to arbitrate his claim against Dongbu.   
 We also point out that there is no provision in his agreement with Guide USA that 
David Kim signed that could be deemed as having granted third-party beneficiary rights 
to Dongbu to enforce any provision in the agreement, and thus he cannot be compelled to 
arbitrate this dispute.  The closest such provision would be one dealing with assignments 
that provides that “[Guide USA] may freely assign this Agreement, in whole or in part . . 
. .  This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties’ 
successors and assigns.”  App. at 745.  But there is no suggestion in the briefs that Guide 
USA assigned the contract to Dongbu or anyone else.  Overall, though as we already 
have explained, we do not reach the question that Dongbu raises with regard to 
determining whether a district court or a court of appeals decides if an appeal is frivolous 
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for jurisdictional purposes under Ehleiter, it is obvious that this appeal from the order 
denying arbitration in this case is completely without merit.6
 But there is even a further reason to affirm the order denying arbitration for if 
Dongbu could demonstrate that it had a right to submit the Kims’ claims to arbitration, 
taking the “case specific” approach that our cases indicate is appropriate, Dongbu waived 
any right that it might have had to seek to have the Kims’ claims submitted to arbitration.  
See Gray Holdco, Inc. v. Cassady, 654 F.3d 444, 451 (3d Cir. 2011).  As we indicated 
above, Dongbu without mentioning arbitration moved to dismiss the complaint, a step 
that sometimes in itself indicates that if the moving party had a right to have a dispute 
submitted to arbitration it has waived that right.  See Ritzel Commc’ns, Inc. v. Mid-
American Cellular Tel. Co., 989 F.2d 966, 969-70 (8th Cir. 1993).  Dongbu first raised 
arbitration as a defense in this case on July 5, 2012, at the hearing on the Kims’ 
application for a preliminary injunction after the District Court earlier had denied 
Dongbu’s motion to dismiss the case on the merits.  Thus, significant resources were 
expended before Dongbu moved for an order sending the case to arbitration because both 
the District Court and the Kims needed to prepare for and participate in the hearing of 
 
                                              
6 We would reach this conclusion under any possible standard that could be applicable.  
See Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C, No. 12-1170, ____ F.3d ____, 
____, 2013 WL 2302324, at *5 (3d Cir. May 28, 2013). 
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July 5, 2012, and both the Court and the Kims engaged in the other proceedings in this 
case before that day that we have described.7
 Furthermore, Dongbu is continuing to act inconsistently with its contention that 
this case should be submitted to arbitration.  See Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd. v. 
Bombardier Recreational Prods., Inc., 660 F.3d 988, 995-96 (7th Cir. 2011); see also 
Ritzel, 989 F.2d at 969; St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum 
Prods. Co., 969 F.2d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 1992).  In this regard, Dongbu sets forth the three 
issues that it believes are being presented on this appeal, one of which is “[w]hether the 
district court erred in failing to dismiss [a]ppellees’ complaint because the complaint 
failed to state a plausible claim for relief.”  Appellants’ br. at 3.  Dongbu sets forth this 
issue after it claims that the District Court erred in not ordering arbitration.  It is therefore 
perfectly clear that Dongbu seeks to have this case arbitrated only if it cannot win it by 
motion in the District Court or this Court.  It is also significant that Dongbu filed an 
amended answer on July 19, 2012, in the District Court which included a counterclaim 
seeking damages against the Kims, a step hardly consistent with a request for the 
submission of the case to arbitration. 
 
                                              
7 We realize that Dongbu contends that it did not have the agreement between DDK NY 
or David Kim and Guide USA until shortly before the July 5, 2012 hearing and thus was 
unaware of the arbitration clause in that agreement.  Thus, in its reply brief Dongbu 
asserts that “it was not until shortly before the preliminary injunction hearing that 
Appellants obtained a copy of one of the Independent Contractor agreements between 
plaintiffs and Guide USA, i.e., that was signed by plaintiff David Kim.”  Appellants’ rep. 
br. at 5.  That circumstance is immaterial as surely it was Dongbu’s burden to be aware of 
contracts that it claims included provisions for its benefit.  
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 We mention one final point.  In its brief Dongbu contends that the “district court’s 
views are fixed and therefore, on remand, the case should be reassigned to a new judge . . 
. .”  Appellants’ br. at 54.  We see no basis to make such a reassignment and thus we will 
deny that request. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal at No. 12-3367 from the 
order of July 23, 2012, and will affirm the order of July 25, 2012, denying Dongbu’s 
motion seeking arbitration of this dispute.8
                                              
8 Our opinion should not be overread.  We decide only one substantive issue on this 
appeal, which is that, regardless of the legal characterization of the relationship between 
the Kims and Dongbu, this case will not be submitted to arbitration.  Thus, we are not 
determining whether the Kims were employees of Dongbu or whether their claims 
against Dongbu are meritorious. 
 
 
 
